

## Message Text

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PAGE 01 STATE 232170

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMCONSUL FRANKFURT

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FOR RTC AND RSS

FOLLOWING REPEAT LONDON 14845 SENT SECSTATE DATED SEPT 25.

QUOTE

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E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: ASEC

SUBJECT: SECURITY PROTECTION AFFORDED PUBLIC ACCESS

AREAS OF EMBASSY

REF: A) STATE 210312

B) LONDON A-391, MAY 1, 1974

1. SUMMARY: THE PUBLIC ACCESS AREAS OF THE EMBASSY ARE VULNERABLE TO TERRORIST PENETRATION. THEIR SECURITY COULD BE INCREASED BY THE INSTALLATION OF ELECTRONIC SCREENING DEVICES AT ALL THREE GROUND FLOOR ENTRANCES, THE INSTALLATION OF A SPECIAL ALARM SYSTEM, THE HIRING AND TRAINING OF ADDITIONAL GUARD/RECEPTIONISTS, AND THE ASSIGNMENT OF ADDITIONAL MARINES. END SUMMARY.

2. IN RESPONSE TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FY-74 ANTI-TERRORISM BUDGET AMENDMENT, A NUMBER OF MEASURES HAVE  
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PAGE 02 STATE 232170

BEEN TAKEN OR ARE BEING TAKEN TO ENHANCE THE PHYSICAL

SECURITY OF THE EMBASSY. THESE INCLUDE SPECIAL REMOTE ELEVATOR CONTROL SWITCHES, THE INSTALLATION OF WINDOW GRILLES AROUND THE LOWER GROUND FLOOR, THE APPLICATION OF MYLAR PLASTIC TO WINDOWS ON THE FIRST FOUR FLOORS, THE INSTALLATION OF A MOTORIZED STEEL DOOR GRILLE AT THE ENTRANCE TO THE LOWER GROUND GARAGE, THE TRANSFER OF THE DISPATCHER'S OFFICE TO THE ENTRANCE OF THE BASEMENT GARAGE ENTRANCE FOR BETTER VISUAL CONTROL, AND THE ASSIGNMENT TO THE EMBASSY OF TWO ADDITIONAL MARINES AND TWO ADDITIONAL CIVILIAN GUARD/RECEPTIONISTS.

3. AS A RESULT OF THESE AND EARLIER PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES, WE BELIEVE THAT THE FIRST FLOOR AND ALL FLOORS ABOVE ARE MORE SECURE AGAINST A TERRORIST PENETRATION THAN PREVIOUSLY. THE SEMI-PUBLIC AREAS OF THE EMBASSY ON THE GROUND FLOOR, HOWEVER, CONTAINING THE CONSULAR SECTION, THE USIS LIBRARY AND OTHER USIS OFFICES, AN IRS OFFICE, AND THE US NAVY DISPENSARY REMAIN VULNERABLE TO ATTACK. (FOR A DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PHYSICAL LAYOUT OF THE EMBASSY, SEE REF B.)

4. CONSIDERING THE LARGE NUMBERS OF PEOPLE WHO VISIT THE EMBASSY (OVER 300,000 ANNUALLY FOR CONSULAR SERVICES ALONE), MAXIMUM PROTECTION OF THE PUBLIC ACCESS AREAS IS BOUND TO BE SIGNIFICANTLY MORE DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE THAN PROTECTION OF THE UPPER FLOORS, AND WILL IN ANY EVENT HAVE TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION IMPORTANT OPERATIONAL AND PUBLIC RELATIONS REQUIREMENTS. AT A MINIMUM WE BELIEVE THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL MEASURES COULD BE TAKEN:

A) TRANSFORMATION OF THE PRESENT GROUND FLOOR RECEPTION DESK INTO A COMMAND POST MANNED EXCLUSIVELY BY MARINES, AND CONTAINING ELEVATOR CONTROLS, CLOSED CIRCUIT TV SURVEILLANCE OF THE ENTIRE OUTSIDE OF THE BUILDING AND ALL ENTRANCES, AND A SPECIALIZED EMBASSY-WIDE ALARM SYSTEM.

B) TRANSFER OF THE MAIN ENTRANCE RECEPTION DESK IN LOBBY TO A LOCATION NEARER PUBLIC ENTRANCE AND MANNING IT SOLELY BY CIVILIAN GUARD/RECEPTIONISTS.  
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PAGE 03 STATE 232170

C) INSTALLATION AT ALL THREE GROUND FLOOR ENTRANCES OF ELECTRONIC SCREENING DEVICES SIMILAR TO THOSE USED AT AIRPORTS. THEY WOULD HAVE TO BE MANNED BY WELL-TRAINED LOCAL CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES SENSITIVE TO THE PUBLIC RELATIONS ASPECTS OF THEIR WORK. THE PRESENT PRACTICE OF REQUIRING VISITORS TO THE EMBASSY TO SUBMIT THEIR HANDBAGS AND BRIEFCASES FOR INSPECTION IS NOT ADEQUATE

TO PREVENT SURREPTITIOUS SMUGGLING OF WEAPONS AND EXPLOSIVES INTO CHANCERY.

D) ESTABLISHMENT OF ONE MARINE POST AT EACH GROUND FLOOR ENTRANCE DURING WORKING HOURS PLUGGED INTO EMBASSY-WIDE ALARM SYSTEM, IN ADDITION TO THE TWO MARINES WHO PRESENTLY TOUR THE BUILDING. THIS WOULD ENTAIL THE ASSIGNMENT OF AN ADDITIONAL EIGHT MARINES TO EMBASSY LONDON.

5. THE FLOORS BELOW THE PUBLIC ACCESS AREAS ARE ALSO VULNERABLE TO TERRORIST ATTACK, ALTHOUGH CLEARLY LESS SO THAN THE GROUND FLOOR. NEW PHYSICAL DEVICES AND TIGHTENED ACCESS PROCEDURES SHOULD DIMINISH THE LIKELIHOOD OF A SUCCESSFUL ARMED PENETRATION OF THESE AREAS. THEY DO REMAIN VULNERABLE, HOWEVER, TO BOMBS PLANTED IN OR UNDER THE VEHICLES DRIVEN IN AND OUT OF THE GARAGES EVERY DAY. ONE WAY TO GUARD AGAINST THIS WOULD BE TO ASSIGN ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL TO CHECK ALL INCOMING VEHICLES FOR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES.

6. IT WOULD BE ADVISABLE TO CONTROL ACCESS TO THE BOILER ROOM IN THE SUB-BASEMENT MORE CLOSELY ALONG THE LINES LAID DOWN IN REF B, PP. 17-18.

7. IT WOULD ALSO BE ADVISABLE TO INSTALL AUTOMATIC LOCKING DEVICES ON THE DOORS AT THE THREE ENTRANCES TO THE CONSULAR SECTION LEADING OFF FROM THE MAIN LOBBY.

8. FINALLY, AS A GENERAL PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE, IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO INSTALL A DISTINCTIVE ALARM SYSTEM THROUGHOUT THE BUILDING TO ALERT ALL EMBASSY PERSONNEL TO TERRORIST ATTACK AND TO INSTRUCT SAID PERSONNEL IN LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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PAGE 04 STATE 232170

WHAT TO DO AND NOT TO DO IN VARIOUS TERRORIST-LINKED CONTINGENCIES.

9. N.B. THIS MESSAGE ADDRESSES THE PHYSICAL SECURITY OF THE CHANCERY ALONE. IT DOES NOT DEAL WITH THE SECURITY OF EMBASSY PERSONNEL WHILE THEY ARE AWAY FROM THE CHANCERY NOR DOES IT TOUCH ON THE PHYSICAL SECURITY OF THE US TRADE CENTER OR THE US TRAVEL SERVICE BOTH OF WHICH ARE LOCATED ELSEWHERE IN THE CITY AND MUST BE RECKONED VULNERABLE TO TERRORIST ATTACK.

RICHARDSON UNQUOTE INGERSOLL

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